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Abstract
This paper discusses a recent opposition between the inﬂuential dynamic
semantic account of presupposition projection and a recent Gricean-pragmatic
theory. The Gricean-pragmatic theory is partly motivated by an inﬂuential ob-
jection to dynamic semantics based on the compatibility of dynamic systems
with connectives and operators exhibiting deviant projection behaviors. By
identifying key features of the role of prediction and explanation in semantics,
it is argued that the objection is based on a mistaken conception of the involve-
ment of empirical foundations in semantic theories. The paper shows that the
dynamic paradigm does not suffer from either predictive or explanatory inad-
equacy. The chapter concludes that while it is too early to decide in favor of
either approach, the Gricean alternative to dynamic semantics cannot be seen
as motivated by a ﬂaw in the latter theories.
Keywords Presupposition, presupposition projection, dynamic semantics, Gricean
maxims, prediction, explanation
1 Introduction
Here is a familiar dialectic. Attention is drawn to a phenomenon in natural lan-
guage that apparently deﬁes treatment from within classical semantics. Two choices
emerge. Either abandon classicism to predict the data directly by semantic means.
Or keep the classical semantics and account for the data pragmatically. Grice’s
‘Logic and Conversation’ (1975) both clearly delineated this type of dialectics for the
ﬁrst time and provided a paradigmatic instance of the pragmatic route. This chap-
ter examines a more recent instance of this broadly Gricean dialectic. The opposi-
tion here is between two theories of presupposition projection – the phenomenon by
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which the presuppositions of compound sentences are determined by those of their
parts. Semantic revisionism is represented by the inﬂuential dynamic semantic ac-
count developed by Heim (1982), (1983). Semantic conservatism by Schlenker’s
(2008a) Transparency Theory, which is built on two Gricean maxims of manner: Be
Articulate and Be Brief.
A central part of the motivation for the Transparency Theory comes from a par-
ticular kind of objection to the dynamic view originally put forward by Rooth (1987)
and Soames (1989). The objection notes that dynamic semantics is consistent with
the existence of sets of connectives that have the same truth conditions but different
projection behaviors. Two conclusions have been drawn from this, namely that the
dynamic view is lacking in predictive adequacy and that it is lacking in explanatory
adequacy.
My purpose in this chapter is to argue that the fact that the system is compatible
with deviant connectives does not show that the dynamic view suffers from either
of these problems. My conclusion will be that although there may be other ways in
which Gricean theories have advantages over the dynamic theory of presupposition
projection, there is no initial advantage, i.e., there is no inherent ﬂaw in the dynamic
conception.
Section 2 provides a sketch of the dynamic system we are concerned with. I call
this the Context Change Theory. Section 3 turns to the Rooth-Soames objection, and to
the notions of prediction and explanation that are involved in this debate. Sections
4 and 5 defend the Context Change Theory against the charges and comment on
the setting of the debate within the Gricean dialectic sketched above.
2 The Context Change Theory
Reacting to the earlier views of Karttunen and Peters (1979), Gazdar (1979), and
Soames (1982), Heim (1983) followed Karttunen (1974) in seeing presuppositions
as admittance conditions on contexts, the idea being that “a sentence can be felici-
tously uttered only in contexts that entail all of its presuppositions.”
1
A context is
here thought of in the familiar Stalnakerian way as a common ground, i.e., a set
of propositions mutually taken for granted among the participants.
2
The common
ground in turn delineates a set of possible worlds, called the context set, deﬁned as
the set of worlds w such that all the propositions in the common ground are true in
w.3
Heim’s innovation was to encode admittance conditions directly into the seman-
tic values of sentences. According to the Context Change Theory, the meaning of
a sentence is a procedure or instruction for updating the common ground of a con-
versation. This kind of dynamic meaning is called a context change potential (CCP).
1
Karttunen (1974, 182).
2
See Stalnaker (1970), (1974), (1978), (1998), (2002).
3
To deal with phenomena involving variables (chieﬂy, anaphora and quantiﬁcation), Heim (1982),
(1983) proposed to view contexts as more ﬁne-grained than sets of worlds. But the simpler conception
is sufﬁcient to handle generalized quantiﬁers (see for example Schlenker (2008a, Sec. 1.2) for a brief
statement, and Beaver (2001, Sec. 7.5.3) for a detailed account), and we may safely conﬁne ourselves to
this representation of contexts for the purposes of the general discussion we are interested in here.
2
The idea that sentence-meanings are CCPs is meant to be taken literally. Heim
(1983) proposed that
a compositional assignment of CCPs to the sentences of a language can fully replace a
compositional assignment of truth conditions of the sort normally envisaged by seman-
ticists, without any loss of empirical coverage.
4
This means that both projection facts and truth-conditional facts are derived from
CCPs. Speciﬁcally, the system consists of two components: an assignment of CCPs
and a set of general principles linking presuppositionality and truth conditions with
context change. From these, results are derived by means of basic logic. The theory,
then, has the overall architecture represented here (where ‘)’ denotes derivability):
Context Change Architecture
CCPs + General Principles) Projection facts + Truth conditions
I here provide a fragment of the theory to serve as the basis of the subsequent dis-
cussion. Examples of CCPs are given in C1.
C1 CCPs:
5
C1a c[p] = fw 2 c : JpKw = 1g.
C1b c[AB ] = # iff 9w 2 c JBKw = 0. Otherwise, c[AB ] = fw 2 c : JAKw =
1g.
C1c c[A and B] = c[A][B].
C1a illustrates the fundamental idea that the CCP of an atomic sentence p is a func-
tion that takes a context and discards from it the worlds that do not satisfy the in-
formation carried by p. In turn, as seen from C1b, the CCP of a presuppositional
sentence AB is a partial function, which is deﬁned for a particular context c if and
only if c entails its presupposition B, i.e., all the worlds in c are B-worlds. When
deﬁned, the CCP of AB proceeds as usual by discarding all the worlds that do not
satisfy its assertive component A. Finally C1c states that the CCP of a conjunction
proceeds by ﬁrst applying the CCP of the left hand conjunct and then applying the
CCP of the right hand conjunct to the resulting local context.
It is important to be clear about a potential confusion at this point. As seen from
C1a, the system relies on a prior assignment of satisfaction conditions to atomic sen-
tences, i.e., an assignment of 1 or 0 relative to worlds. Accordingly, the meanings
of sub-sentential expressions are contributions to these. Hence, it is only sentences
and sentence-forming operators that have CCPs as their meanings, i.e., lexical en-
tries. In what follows, therefore, claims about CCPs being lexical entries are to be
understood as concerning sentences and operators.
Within this system results are derived from CCPs via two general principles
stated in C2:
C2 General Principles:
4
Heim (1983, 253).
5
Notation: I use p, q, .... for atomic, non-presuppositional sentences. And I useA,B, ... for sentences
of arbitrary complexity. And I use AB for a sentence that asserts A and presupposes B.
3
C2a Deﬁnition of truth:
6
If w 2 c and c[A] 6= #, then:
A is true w.r.t. w and c iff w 2 c[A].
A is false w.r.t w and c iff w /2 c[A].
C2b Deﬁnition of presuppositionality:
A context c admits AB iff c[AB ] 6= #.
A presupposes B iff for all c, if c admits A, then c  B.
C2a embodies the Heimian idea that “To be a true sentence is to keep the context
true.”
7
Given C2a, the truth conditions of a particular sentence are recoverable from
the way it constrains the context set, as deﬁned by its CCP. Note that this means
that truth, in this type of semantics, is not deﬁned in terms of the assignment of
satisfaction conditions that CCPs rely on, but is instead deﬁned directly in terms
of context change. This is what we mean by saying that the truth conditions of a
sentence is derived from its CCP.
In turn, C2b captures Karttunen’s (1974) original proposal that presuppositions
are admittance conditions in the sense that, according to C2b, the presuppositions
of a sentence consist of the information that must be entailed by a context in order
for its CCP to be deﬁned for the context in question.
A few simple examples of how the system works will be useful. First, consider
the presuppositional sentence in (1).
(1) The King is bald.
Given C1b (1) is deﬁned if and only if it is common ground that there is a king.
Formally, that is if c entails that there is a king (all the worlds are king-worlds.)
Given C2b, we therefore derive that (1) presupposes that there is a king.
Next, to see how the system derives projection facts, consider the notorious pro-
jection properties associated with conjunction in (2):
(2) a. B and AB presupposes nothing.
b. AB and C presupposes B.
Here is an instance of (2a):
(3) There is a king and the King has a son.
Given C1c, (3) ﬁrst updates c with ‘There is a king’. In the resulting local context
c0 all worlds are king-worlds. We now update c0 with ‘The King has a son’. The
presupposition of this conjunct is trivially satisﬁed for c0. Hence, (3) places no re-
quirements on c. So, given C2b, we derive that (3) presupposes nothing.
Finally, here is an instance of (2b):
(4) The King has a son and everyone’s celebrating.
6
There are problems with this, but there are other options. It turns out to be difﬁcult to get things
right for a large range of expressions and constructions. See, Stokke (2012) for discussion.
7
Heim (1983, 253).
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We ﬁrst update c with ‘The King has a son’. Given C1b, doing so is successfull if
and only if c entails that there is a king. If so, we get c0 where all the worlds are
such that there is a king and the king has a son. We then update c0 with ‘Everyone’s
celebrating’. So given C2b, we derive that (4) presupposes that there is a king.
In sum, then, the Context Change Theory allows us to derive results concern-
ing presupposition projection in a straightforward way. The goal of the rest of this
chapter is to argue that, despite the Rooth-Soames objection, these results are per-
fectly predictive and explanatory.
3 Prediction and Explanation
The Rooth-Soames objection is based on an undeniable observation. The observa-
tion is that the framework in which the Context Change Theory is stated is consis-
tent with the existence of sets of connectives with the same truth-conditional prop-
erties but different projection behaviors. To repeat the typical example, discussed
by Soames (1989), suppose we deﬁne the CCP of a binary connective and* as follows:
C1c* c[A and* B] = c[B][A]
Both and and and* output the intersection of the A-worlds and the B-worlds. So ac-
cording to C2a, a complex sentence formed by either connective is true at a world
w if and only if each of its constituents is true at w. As regards projection behavior,
consider for example (3). Whereas, as we have seen, the CCP for and predicts that
(3) presupposes nothing, the CCP for and* predicts that (3) projects the presuppo-
sition of its second conjunct, i.e., that there is a king. So the pair of and and and* is
an example of connectives with the same truth-conditional behavior but different
projection behaviors.
The conclusion drawn from this is that the Context Change Theory is lacking
in predictive and explanatory adequacy. Yet, although many have endorsed this
conclusion, it has not been made clear what is meant by prediction and explanation
in this context. In fact, the general issue of what constitutes prediction and expla-
nation in the realm of semantic theorizing is vastly underexplored. It is crucial,
therefore, to be explicit about these notions in order to evaluate the charge against
the Context Change Theory.
I will assume that a prediction of a semantic theory is a logical consequence
of the theory. Further, I will assume that the understanding of explanation rele-
vant to the realm of semantic theorizing is roughly that of the so-called Deductive-
Nomological model of scientiﬁc explanation.
8
Salmon (1989) sums up this paradigm
as follows:
[A] D-N explanation of a particular event is a valid deductive argument whose conclu-
sion states that the event to be explained did occur. The conclusion is known as the
explanandum-statement. Its premises – known collectively as the explanans – must include
a statement of at least one general law that is essential to the validity of the argument [...].
If, in addition, the statements constituting the explanans are true, the argument qualiﬁes
as a true explanation or simply an explanation (of the D-N type).
9
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See Salmon (1989), Rosenberg (2000) for introductions.
9
Salmon (1989, 8).
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Although notoriously problematic as a general account of the nature of scientiﬁc
explanation, this conception is congenial to the case of semantic theories due to
the deductive-logical nature of the latter. Semantic theories (in the tradition we
are presupposing here) are essentially sets of empirically motivated axioms from
which one deduces predictions by using logic in the way we demonstrated with
the Context Change Theory earlier.
As this suggests, two kinds of criteria for adequacy are particularly salient in this
connection. The lexical entries of the system must be sufﬁciently motivated, and the
general principles generating the predictions of the theory must be sufﬁciently law-
like. For reasons of space I will not argue for the claim that the latter criterion is met
in this chapter. For the record, I believe that it can be argued successfully that the
general principles in C2 have the relevant characteristics.
10
The overall question at this point, then, is: Why should one think that conjunc-
tion has the CCP of and and not that of and*? In a nutshell, my answer is: Because
the CCP of and is motivated by the data, while the CCP of and* is not.
In the next two sections, I expand on this line of argument and respond to the
objections adduced against the Context Change Theory based on the observation
that it is consistent with deviant connectives.
4 The Charge of Predictive Inadequacy
Heim (1990) conceded the objection to the Context Change Theory in the following
words:
In my 1983 paper, I was less cautious than Karttunen or even Stalnaker and claimed that if
one only spelled out the precise connection between truthconditional meaning and rules
of context change [i.e., CCPs], one would be able to use evidence about truthconditions to
determine the rules of context change, and in this way motivate those rules independently
of the presupposition projection data that they are supposed to account for. I was rightly
taken to task for this [...].
11
We can discern two different ways of looking at the problem in this passage. One
of them objects that the Context Change Theory does not allow one to derive CCPs
from truth conditions. The other that the theory is guilty of a particular kind of
circularity. The ﬁrst of these is a charge concerning predictive adequacy, the second
is one concerning explanatory adequacy. Each of these worries have been expressed
more clearly by others. I respond to each of them, beginning with the ﬁrst below.
4.1 Independence from Truth Conditions
Behind the challenge of predictive inadequacy exhibited by the quotation from
Heim (1990) above is an insistence on a certain kind of tight connection between
10
For example, the principles support counterfactuals. Let k be a context that does not admit ‘The King
is bald’, i.e., k does not entail that there is a king. The fact that the counterfactual ‘If it had been common
ground in k that there is a king, then k would have admitted ‘The King is bald” is true is evidence that
C2b is not merely a true generalization. Cf. Rosenberg (2000, 31–32).
11
Heim (1990, 32).
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CCPs and truth-conditional content. In particular, the objector here claims that
CCPs should be derivable from truth-conditional behavior – and that if this can-
not be achieved, the theory must be seen as lacking in predictive capability.
This allegation is championed by Schlenker:
although truth conditions can be recovered from Context Change Potentials, the converse
is not true. As was noted early on, there are a variety of dynamic connectives that are
compatible with the truth conditions of and [...]. Heim’s account fails to be predictive in
the following sense: if we are given the syntax and classical truth-conditional behavior
of an operator, we cannot thereby predict how it will transmit presuppositions [...].
12
Initially, this complaint appears puzzling in that, quite obviously, the Context Change
Theory never aimed at deriving the CCPs of operators from their truth conditions.
We already quoted Heim (1983) as explicitly stating that the goal of the theory was
the opposite: to derive both truth conditions and projection behavior from CCPs.
The question is, though, whether CCPs can be derived from truth conditions,
and if not, whether there is anything problematic about that. As we will see be-
low, although CCPs cannot in fact be derived from either projection behavior or
from truth conditions, it does not follow that the Context Change Theory fails to be
predictive.
Here are the facts that everyone should agree on:
F1 a. Projection facts are not derivable from truth-conditional facts alone.
b. Truth-conditional facts are not derivable from projection facts alone.
F2 a. Truth-conditional facts are derivable from CCPs.
b. Projection facts are derivable from CCPs.
F3 a. CCPs are not derivable from truth-conditional facts.
b. CCPs are not derivable from projection facts.
F1 states that projection facts and truth-conditional facts are not inter-derivable.
An intuitive way of appreciating F1a is the following. Let 
(A;B) be the result of
applying the binary connective 
 to A and B. Suppose I tell you that the truth-
conditional behavior of 
 is such that 
(A;B) outputs the intersection of the A-
worlds and the B-worlds. Will you be able to tell me how 
 projects presupposi-
tions? No. 
 could project either in the manner of and or that of and* for all you
know.
F1b is justiﬁed by pairs like and and if. Heim’s original entry for the conditional
is given in C1d below.
13
C1d c[If A, then B] = c  ((c[A])  (c[A][B]))
12
Schlenker (2008b, 5–6). See also Schlenker (2008a, 166–167).
13
This CCP predicts that if in natural languages behaves truth-conditionally as the material impli-
cation. (The context returned is the original context minus the worlds in which the antecedent is true
and the consequent is false.) As Heim (1983, 259, n. 1) says, “I don’t believe that, but it doesn’t matter
here.” See Heim (1990) for examples of deviant CCPs that have the same truth-conditional but different
projection behaviors as C1d.
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Now suppose I tell you that 
 is such that 
(A;B) projects the presuppositions
of its left and right constituents except those of the latter that are entailed by the
assertive component of the former. That is, suppose I tell you that 
(AC ; BD) pre-
supposesC^ (A! D). Will you be able to tell me what context set it outputs? No.

 could be either and or if for all you know.
F2 states that one can derive both truth-conditional facts and projection facts
from CCPs. This we have already seen earlier. A CCP tells us both how the con-
nective in question constrains the context set and how the presuppositions of the
complex sentences it forms depend systematically on those of their parts.
F3 is a consequence of F1. One cannot predict the CCP of a connective from
knowing just how it constrains the context set, nor from knowing just how it projects
presuppositions.
The problem Schlenker infers from F3a is that the theory fails to be predictive.
On the natural way of understanding this claim, it is clearly false, as witnessed by
F2. CCPs predict both truth-conditional behavior and projection behavior in the
familiar way, i.e., one can derive these facts from CCPs.
A perhaps more charitable way of understanding Schlenker’s claim that F3a
renders the theory unpredictive is as complaining that CCPs are not predicted by
anything else in the system. This is correct. But there is no problem here. As we
said, the lexical entries of the system need to be empirically motivated, and it is
clear that the CCPs of the Context Change Theory are.
To be slightly more speciﬁc, we can take theory-building to proceed roughly in
the way suggested by the inﬂuential account in Bogen and Woodward (1988). For
instance, we might test speakers’ judgements about conjunctions like (3). We will
get a distribution of judgements, which presumably will converge toward taking
the sentence to presuppose that there is a king (and nothing else.) On the basis of
this data, and more of the same kind, we posit the existence of a phenomenon: the
familiar projection behavior of and, i.e., that “the presuppositions of a conjunction
are the presuppositions required by either of the conjuncts, minus any required by the
second conjunct which are entailed by the ﬁrst.”
14
We believe this phenomenon exists
because of the data we have gathered.
In close interplay with this process, we embark on the project of building a the-
ory to explain and predict this phenomenon (and others.) Our proposal is the Con-
text Change Theory. This theory includes lexical entries, some of which are CCPs.
The reason for choosing a particular CCP is the goal of the project, i.e., to predict
(and hopefully explain) projection facts. So we choose to deﬁne the CCP for and in
the way of C1c, and not in any other way, e.g., that of and*.
As further illustration, it is instructive to consider the case of disjunction be-
cause, as opposed to that of conjunction, there is genuine dispute over what the
right CCP should be in this case. For instance, Beaver (2001) proposes the entry in
C1e, whereas Geurts (1999) argues for C1f, both of which have merits.
C1e c[A or B] = c[A] [ c[not-A][B]
C1f c[A or B] = c[A] [ c[B]
14
Stalnaker (1974, 59).
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Commenting on this opposition, Schlenker takes it to be one of the problems for the
Context Change Theory that
No general principles could be appealed to in order to settle this debate, which is a symp-
tom of exactly the problem that motivated the Transparency theory.
15
So the claim seems to be that in the absence of a general principle that can decide
between the different options for disjunction and rule out deviant connectives like
and*, the Context Change Theory must be seen as unmotivated. But why think so?
Just as the choice of and over and* is empirically motivated, the question of the right
CCP for disjunction should be settled empirically by studying the data. No doubt
this will not be an easy matter. But few things are.
The Context Change Theory takes CCPs as primitive and uses them in combi-
nation with general principles to predict truth conditions and projection facts. Such
a theory cannot be blamed for not deriving CCPs from anything else in the system.
5 The Charge of Explanatory Inadequacy
We have seen that the fact that CCPs cannot be derived from truth conditions does
not justify the conclusion that the Context Change Theory is not predictive. The
remaining charge that the theory is not explanatory is, I think, more substantial,
and I therefore dedicate more space to it. I begin by considering the circularity
worry expressed by Heim (1990).
5.1 A Worry about Circularity
The concern about circularity is found in the way Soames originally formulated the
problem raised by deviant connectives such as his example of and*:
[I]t cannot be that the reason that conjunctions inherit presuppositions in the way that
they do, rather than in accordance with [C1c*], is because the semantics of conjunction
are given by [C1c]; and, moreover, that the reason that [C1c], rather than [C1c*], gives the
semantics of conjunction is that conjunctions inherit presuppositions in the way that they
do.
16
Soames’s objection, then, is that the Context Change Theory simultaneously en-
dorses the following two incompatible claims:
S1 The fact that a connective or operator exhibits a particular projection behavior
is explained by the fact that it has a particular CCP.
S2 The fact that a connective or operator has a particular CCP is explained by
the fact that it exhibits a particular projection behavior.
S1 and S2 are clearly not tenable together. But what is wrong with this objection is
that the Context Change Theory does not endorse S2. It only endorses S1.
15
Schlenker (2008c, 289).
16
Soames (1989, 598).
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First, recall that according to the Context Change Theory, the meanings of con-
nectives are CCPs. As we saw, the predictions of the theory – in turn aspiring to the
status of explanations – are derived from CCPs. So the Context Change Theory is
clearly committed to S1. And, given that CCPs are meanings, S1 is clearly the more
palatable of the two: the reason and projects the way it does is that it means what it
does, not the other way around.
Second, as I suggested earlier, arriving at the right CCPs is an empirical project
of the kind described by Bogen and Woodward (1988). There are two phenomena
to be accounted for, truth-conditional behavior and projection behavior. But the
fact that observations motivate hypothesizing C1c as the lexical entry for and does
not mean that the theory must accept S2. The Context Change Theory is not com-
mitted to the claim that the fact that and has the lexical entry it has is explained by
these observations. The direction of explanation is uniquely in the other direction.
The fact that and has the truth-conditional behavior and the projection behavior it
does is explained by the fact that it has the CCP in C1c. And the reason the theory
postulates that CCP for and, and not one of the deviant ones, is motivated by the
desire to explain the phenomena that have been inferred from the data.
Finally, we should avoid confusing this issue with another one, which concerns
the question of what explains why conjunction has the CCP it does. The Context
Change Theory does not offer an answer to this question. Is that a problem? No.
To think that it is a problem is to conﬂate a widely familiar and thoroughly uncon-
troversial distinction between what Stalnaker has termed descriptive vs. foundational
semantics. He writes:
A descriptive-semantic theory is a theory that says what the semantics for the language
is, without saying what it is about the practice of using that language that explains why
that semantics is the right one. [...] Second, there are questions, which I will call questions
of ‘foundational semantics’, about what the facts are that give expressions their semantic
values, or more generally, about what makes it the case that the language spoken by a
particular individual or community has a particular descriptive semantics.
17
Clearly, the Context Change Theory is a descriptive theory in this sense. It sets itself
the goal of stating what the semantic values of expressions and constructions are.
But it makes no claim to explaining why expressions have those particular semantic
values and not others. For example, the theory states the meaning (i.e., the CCP) of
and, but it makes no claim to explaining why and has this meaning.
Since the Context Change Theory endorses S1 but does not endorse S2, there
is no basis for the charge of explanatory circularity. Nor does the theory endorse
a claim like S2 albeit with a different explanans. And it cannot be blamed for not
doing so. To be sure, one can have the view that what we utlimately want is some
conglomerate of theories encompassing answers to both the descriptive and the
foundational questions. But one cannot refute a descriptive theory by complaining
that it is not, or is not also, a foundational theory.
18
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Stalnaker (1997, 535). This distinction is roughly the same as the one between semantics and metase-
mantics found in Kaplan (1989).
18
Another concern, of course, is whether the Context Change Theory is ultimately capable of being
associated with a suitable foundational-semantic theory. One might think that the kind of Stalnakerian
motivation for the CCP for and – we process conjunctive sentences from left to right – is not obviously
10
5.2 Gricean Architecture
Schlenker’s challenge of predictive inadequacy rested on the assumption that CCPs
should be derived from truth-conditional content. We noted that this assumption
is unmotivated in the presence of the Context Change Theory. A slightly different,
but related, perspective is found in the way Schlenker formulates what he takes to
be the explanatory challenge raised by deviant connectives:
Explanatory Challenge (Schlenker)
Find an algorithm that predicts how any operator transmits presuppo-
sitions once its syntax and its classical semantics have been speciﬁed.
19
It is an artifact of Schlenker’s own conception of the issue that this challenge is spec-
iﬁed as pertaining to the classical semantics of the connectives. So, more generally,
the Gricean idea can be summarized as the claim that what we want is a theory with
the following schematic structure:
Gricean Architecture
Semantics + X ) Projection facts
An example of an approach instantiating this schema is Stalnaker’s (1974) recom-
mendation of a Gricean, pragmatic account of presuppositions and of projection.
Stalnaker held that
The pragmatic account makes it possible to explain some particular facts about presup-
positions in terms of general maxims of rational communication rather than in terms of
complicated and ad hoc hypotheses about the semantics of particular words and particular
kinds of constructions.
20
Famously, Stalnaker gave an account of conjunction that provided the inspiration
for Heim’s dynamic account, and which turned on the following assumption:
when a speaker says something of the form A and B, he may take it for granted that A
(or at least that his audience recognizes that he accepts that A) after he has said it. The
proposition that A will be added to the background of common assumptions before the
speaker asserts that B.21
Let us call this Incremental Assertion. Then Stalnaker’s account of presupposition
projection in conjunctions has the following structure:
22
available for the other CCPs postulated by the theory. (Thanks to Michael Glanzberg and Matthew Stone
for pressing this.) This I take to be a more serious concern. However, this problem is not a version of
the Rooth-Soames objection, i.e., it is not a problem concerning the existence of deviant connectives like
and*. Although this may be a concern that will ultimately count against the Context Change Theory, it
is not one that we are concerned with here.
19
Schlenker (2008b, 8), (2008c, 287).
20
Stalnaker (1974, 48).
21
Stalnaker (1974, 60).
22
Stalnaker (1974) never indicates whether he is taking the semantics to be classical, i.e., bivalent, or
not. The account in Stalnaker (1978) turns on explicitly accepting a semantics in which presupposition
failure results in semantic undeﬁnedness, which is interpreted as being neither true nor false. Cf. Fox
(2008, 246–247). Also note that Incremental Assertion is not the relevant principle that a Stalnakerian
account will appeal to in order to explain other types of projection facts. See for example, Stalnaker’s
(1974) account of the projection behavior of factive verbs.
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Semantics + Incremental Assertion) Projection facts
The claim is that, given Incremental Assertion, when a speaker utters A and B, and
all goes well, A is already part of the common ground once B gets uttered, and this
explains why any presuppositions of B that are entailed by A disappear, i.e., they
do not project out and become separate requirements on the common ground.
5.3 The Transparency Theory
Generalizing from the above, a Gricean theory in this area is a theory with the ar-
chitecture just illustrated, i.e., a theory that derives projection facts from seman-
tic clauses plus some (independently motivated) pragmatic principles. Schlenker’s
Transparency Theory is explicitly a return to this theoretical strategy.
In terms of the general schema above, the Transparency Theory has the follow-
ing structure:
Transparency Theory Architecture
Classical semantics + Incremental Transparency) Projection facts
Incremental Transparency is a pragmatic principle which in Schlenker’s theory is
derived from the conjunction of two Gricean maxims of manner, Be Articulate and
Be Brief :
23
Be Articulate
In any syntactic environment, express the meaning of an expressionAB
as B and AB (... unless independent pragmatic principles rule out the
full conjunction.)
Be Brief
Avoid unnecessary prolixity.
For example, Be Articulate tells you that, if possible, you should say ‘There is a king
and the King has a son’ (B and AB) rather than ‘The King has a son’ (AB). Be Brief
tells you not to say more than you have to in order to get your point across in the
given conversational context. If something is ruled out by Be Brief, we say that it is
transparent. So ‘There is a king’ might be transparent because already accepted by
the participants. Be Brief always trumps Be Articulate. And furthermore, the full
version of Be Brief is stated in an incremental fashion taking into account the linear
order of the syntactic string in which the presupposition trigger occurs.
24
This allows one to derive the principle of Incremental Transparency.
25
Incremental Transparency (Schlenker)
Given a context set c, a predicative or propositional occurrence of ab is
23
Cf. Schlenker (2008a, 170–172). Be Brief is inherited directly from Grice (1975, 27). Be Articulate is
taken as primitive but, as Schlenker (2008a, 171) says, ”Be Articulate should ultimately be derived from
Grice’s ‘Maxim of Manner’, and speciﬁcally from the requirement that one be ‘orderly’.”
24
Note that in order to handle particular types of examples, the theory alternatively appeals to a sym-
metric version of the Transparency principle. See Schlenker (2008a, Sec. 3).
25
See Schlenker (2008a, 172–175).
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acceptable in a sentence that begins with ab if the ‘articulated’ com-
petitor (b and a) is ruled out because b is transparent,
if for any expression  of the same type as b and for any good ﬁnal ,
c  (b and ) , .
In other words, ‘The King has a son’ is acceptable only if the context already entails
that there is a king. And in general, as Schlenker (2008a, Sec. 2.4) shows, this theory
derives all the results regarding presupposition projection of the Context Change
Theory.
5.4 Explanation vs. Stipulation
Given this, we can bring out a version of the explanatory challenge that rests on
architectural considerations. This version of the problem starts from a general as-
sumption. The assumption is that if some phenomenon to be accounted for y can be
derived from x via general principles, then a theory that does so is to be preferred
to a theory that stipulates y. Fox (2008) gives voice to this point of view:
It is, in principle, possible that facts about presupposition projection need to be stipulated
[...], and if this turns out to be the case, it would be a rather sad state of affairs. We will,
of course, want to claim that this is not the case the moment we are able to eliminate the
stipulations in favor of a general statement.
26
We can see this assumption as a general claim about the superiority of explanatory
theories. Broadly speaking, given a Deductive-Nomological conception of expla-
nation, deriving y from x via suitable general principles P1 : : : Pn amounts to ex-
plaining y in terms of x and P1 : : : Pn. A theory that explains y in this way is to be
preferred to a theory that stipulates y.
One might think that there is an asymmetry between the two architectures along
these lines. For instance, it might be claimed that whereas the Context Change The-
ory merely stipulates projection facts, the Transparency Theory explains projection
facts because it derives them. Yet we already have the resources to answer this po-
tential objection. The Context Change Theory does not stipulate projection facts.
Rather, it derives projection facts from CCPs plus the general deﬁnition of presup-
positionality in terms of admittance. In fact, as we have seen, the Context Change
Theory derives both truth-conditional facts and projection facts from CCPs via gen-
eral principles.
The Context Change Theory, then, is not in bad standing in terms of this worry
about stipulation. The theory explains presupposition projection and truth-conditional
content in terms of the basic idea that the meaning of a sentence is an instruction for
altering contextual information. By abandoning the classical claim that meaning is
representational, and hence that utterances trafﬁc in information about the world,
in favor of the dynamic conception that meaning is procedural in the sense that
utterances manipulate discourse information, it is able to explain the problematic
phenomena by semantic means.
27
26
Fox (2008, fn. 4).
27
For relevant discussion of the dynamic vs. traditional conceptions of meaning, see Stokke (2012).
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5.5 Gricean Foundations and some Problematic Predictions
It would be too quick, however, to conclude that the Context Change Architecture
has an advantage over the Gricean Architecture because it explains both projec-
tion facts and truth-conditional facts in terms of more basic facts, whereas Gricean
theories only explain projection facts in terms of basic facts. The reason is that the
principle of Incremental Transparency is not a primitive within the Transparency
Theory; it is in turn derived from the maxims Be Brief and Be Articulate, both of
which are ultimately taken to be derivable from the supermaxim of manner:
Maxim of Manner
Be perspicuous.
28
In this way, the theory aspires to the Gricean aim to, in Stalnaker’s words quoted
above, “explain some particular facts about presuppositions in terms of general
maxims of rational communication [...].”
29
Doing so may be seen as an instance of
abiding by the general methodological principle that Grice (1978) called Modiﬁed
Occam’s Razor:
Modiﬁed Occam’s Razor
Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity.
As we noted at the outset, then, the dialectic between the Context Change Archi-
tecture and the Gricean Architecture is an instance of the general kind of situation
that Grice identiﬁed. We have a simple semantic theory T (classical semantics) of a
particular class of expressions E (connectives and operators.) Then certain facts U
(presupposition projection) involvingE are observed, which seem to present coun-
terexamples to T . As a consequence, a more complex alternative T 0 (dynamic se-
mantics) to T is proposed. However, the proponent of T may salvage her original
theory, if she can demonstrate that U is in fact explained by T together with other
principles P , which her objector already accepts, or should accept, and which are
independently motivated.
The independent principles that the Gricean appeals to are the maxims (as well
as Grice’s general Cooperative Principle.) Ultimately, these principles are taken to
be, in a rough sense, constitutive of rational cooperative behavior, although there
is no worked out theory of whether, and how, these principles can be grounded in
facts about rationality. As Grice says,
I would like to be able to show that observance of the Cooperative Principle and maxims
is reasonable (rational) along the following lines: that anyone who cares about the goals
that are central to conversation/communication (such as giving and receiving informa-
tion, inﬂuencing and being inﬂuenced by others) must be expected to have an interest,
given suitable circumstances, in participation in talk exchanges that will be proﬁtable
only on the assumption that they are conducted in general accordance with the Coop-
erative Principle and the maxims. Whether any such conclusion can be reached, I am
uncertain [...].
30
28
Cf. Grice (1975, 27).
29
Stalnaker (1974, 48).
30
Grice (1975, 29–30).
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Ultimately, then, a Gricean theory of presupposition projection is a theory that pro-
poses to explain projection facts in terms of classical semantics plus general princi-
ples governing rational, cooperative behavior.
If this turns out to be feasible, it will certainly be a stupendous theoretical achieve-
ment. Indeed, if it a theory turns out to be available, which both makes the right
predictions and which can be situated within a successful Gricean program, then
such a theory will have a high claim to being preferable to a semantic theory of
presupposition projection.
The debate over the general Gricean program has been extensive, and it is not
under evaluation in this chapter.
31
I will refrain, therefore, from any conclusions
concerning the merits of the Transparency Theory based on the ultimate feasibil-
ity of the project of explaining projection facts in terms of independent principles
governing rational behavior.
We can note, though, that independently of these broader motivations, the the-
ory will be preferable only if it makes the right predictions, i.e., derives the right
results. As has been pointed out by Beaver (2008), the Transparency Theory, as it
stands, generates some incorrect predictions. As Beaver shows, the theory predicts
that all of the examples in (5) presuppose nothing.
(5) a. If Barack is pleased that he won and Hillary is upset that Barack won, that
should not surprise anyone.
b. Maybe it’s a Californian who’s paying for a space ﬂight and the person
paying for a space ﬂight is a tech millionaire.
c. It’s not the case that the King of France is bald and the King of France is
rich.
And yet, intuitively, (5a) presupposes that Barack won, (5b) that someone is paying
for a space ﬂight, and (5c) that there is a King of France.
It is too early to tell, then, whether a Gricean theory of presupposition projection
is both feasible and preferable to the dynamic alternative. So while what I have
said does not justify conclusions about the explanatory superiority of either type of
theoretical architecture, it may be concluded that there is nothing inherently wrong
with the Context Change Architecture in terms of explanatory power.
6 Conclusion
I have argued that no valid complaint can be inferred from the possibility of deﬁn-
ing deviant connectives within the framework of the Context Change Theory. A
Gricean theory of presupposition projection, therefore, cannot be seen as motivated
by a ﬂaw in the Heimian paradigm. Instead, such a theory must be seen as an in-
dependently motivated, alternative account, which should be evaluated alongside
the Context Change Theory against the host of parameters that in general serve as
the basis of theory-choice in this area.
31
For a small sample, see Sperber and Wilson (1986), Davis (1998), Levinson (2000), Carston (2004),
Allott (2007).
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